

WRITTEN LISTS OF MILITARY  
PERSONNEL IN CLASSICAL ATHENS <sup>1</sup>

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The appearance of written lists<sup>2</sup> frequently accompanies a culture's attainment of a certain basic level of literacy.<sup>3</sup> This is partly because such lists provide a substantial payoff. They require relatively little grammatical or literary sophistication to create; they are, depending on the inscriptional medium, easily corrected and maintained; and they are accessible to a broad range of readers, including those with minimal literacy skills. Yet at the same time such lists comprise a valuable tool for classifying, quantifying, and ordering the world.<sup>4</sup> It is thus not surprising that they also formed a significant part of the writing generated by classical Athens. This city's penchant for keeping lists, especially of names, accelerated dramatically after approximately 460 BCE, and ultimately encompassed a wide variety of groups and sub-groups.<sup>5</sup> Yet Athens' creation, maintenance, and use of name-lists was more than just a specific instance of a general pattern. As recent scholarship has shown, the force of particular circumstances had a pronounced impact on the development of literacy throughout ancient Greece.<sup>6</sup> Athens' use of written lists in connection with its military personnel therefore needs to be situated with regard to two of its most salient features: democracy and empire. For while other *poleis* made

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<sup>1</sup> I am grateful for the helpful comments I received from those attending the conference in Winnipeg, especially Greg Anderson, whose critical attentions improved the finished piece. I also thank my Creighton colleague Greg Bucher, who read several drafts along the way. Finally, I thank Craig Cooper for his unceasing work in organizing the conference and subsequent volume.

<sup>2</sup> Lists committed to writing differ substantially from those performed orally: on the latter see Minchin 1999.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas 1989: 66.

<sup>4</sup> Goody 1977: 80–90.

<sup>5</sup> On the expansion of writing after roughly 460 see Davies 1993: 51ff. Other examples of name-lists kept at Athens include state debtors, disfranchised citizens, archons, members of the *boulé*, victors in dramatic contests, classes of ephebes, enfranchised Plataeans, and the heroes of Phyle.

<sup>6</sup> Yunis 2003: 1–14.

some use of military lists, none did so as effectively or thoroughly as the Athenians.<sup>7</sup>

The course of Athenian history during the Pentecontaetia provided a particular impetus for the development of military records. At first these lists resulted from the decentralized, non-uniform practices of private individuals serving as generals.<sup>8</sup> In turning to written lists, these officers were responding to several trends: basic changes in the nature of warfare; their increased tactical independence; the growing political importance of their office; and the *dēmos*' consequent desire to limit their power and hold them accountable. However, the private practices of individual generals were soon adapted by the city for its own purposes.<sup>9</sup> Lists of military personnel appeared and developed roughly in tandem with a number of significant polis practices which they no doubt facilitated, if not prompted: pay for military service, the *patrios nomos*, and support for the orphans of the war dead. What began as an ad hoc means of planning and self-protection on the part of the generals ultimately became a collective sort of intellectual capital which the polis used to support its democratic and imperial inclinations.

The period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars saw the rise of written lists to delineate subsets of male citizens for military purposes. Four groups in particular had to be identified year in and year out: those eligible for military service; those called up for particular campaigns; those serving; and those who died under arms. The deme registers, or *lexiarkhika grammateia*, were crucial starting points.<sup>10</sup> Maintained by demarchs and handed down from year to year, they served as physical representations of civic identity, and collectively defined the

<sup>7</sup> For instance, the Spartans listed *nominatim* the men who perished at Thermopylae (Herod. 7.224; Paus. 3.14.1). But the Athenians made greater use of writing in this regard and developed its capabilities more extensively. See Cartledge 1978: 25–37.

<sup>8</sup> It is likely that other officers such as taxiarchs, hipparchs, and trierarchs cooperated with the generals in the development and maintenance of these lists.

<sup>9</sup> Yunis (2003: 14) notes that once written texts existed, they were often put to new and originally unintended uses.

<sup>10</sup> The first indisputable mention of these documents occurs at line 6 of *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 138, which dates to before 434. Their origin is likely much earlier. Whitehead (1986: 35 n. 130) suggests a link with the Cleisthenic reforms of 508/7. Lines 29–30 of the Themistocles Decree (*ML* 23) also mention the *lexiarkhika grammateia*; if the decree actually dates to 480, then the registers will have existed before then. The attention to ancestry and descent manifest in Pericles' citizenship law argues strongly for a *terminus ante quem* of 451/0. See Patterson 1981: 13–28.

largest available pool of citizen manpower.<sup>11</sup> From these registers other lists, at once more focused and more ephemeral, were developed and inscribed on *sanides* (wooden tablets).<sup>12</sup>

Athens' need to identify military groupings of men grew from its reliance on conscription during the classical period. Earlier, during archaic times, its campaigns tended to be short affairs fought by hoplites and cavalry close to home. The requisite military forces could be gathered in a variety of ways: from volunteers; from clan or phratry groups; by employing foreigners; or by occasional city-wide muster.<sup>13</sup> Only in the wake of the Cleisthenic reforms and engagement with the Great King did the need for levies arise.<sup>14</sup> The Athenians soon found themselves fighting farther afield, and engaged in a new sort of warfare whose constitutive elements, the trireme fleet and the siege, required large numbers of troops for long periods of time. The expansion of the navy, the war against Persia, the creation of the Delian League, and the subsequent development of empire created a need for hoplites, rowers, and marines that was urgent and persistent.<sup>15</sup>

Apart from the *lexiarkhika grammateia*, no comprehensive personnel lists were created or maintained by deme or polis during the fifth century;<sup>16</sup> the pressure to identify appropriate sub-groups of citizens fell rather on individuals who responded on an ad hoc basis.<sup>17</sup> While the *ekklésia* (assembly) decided overall military strategy, defined campaigns, and frequently provided detailed instructions, it usually left the details of selecting and mustering troops to the generals assigned to various

<sup>11</sup> Metics could also be conscripted, and were required to have a *proxenos* (citizen sponsor) and register with the polemarch. See Whitehead 1977: 82–86.

<sup>12</sup> On *sanides* in general see Fischer 2003: 245–248.

<sup>13</sup> On pre-Cleisthenic mobilization see Frost 1984. Volunteers could be attracted by potential spoils or farmland (e.g. Plut. *Solon* 8.3, 9.2; Herod. 6.36). Opposition to Cylon's attempted coup was led by the Alcmeonids. The Peisistratids depended on non-Athenian mercenaries. See further Anderson 2003: 149–150.

<sup>14</sup> Lines 23–40 of the Themistocles Decree (*ML* 23) explicitly mention conscription, and [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.1 suggests that men were being drafted prior to the Ephialtic reforms of 462. See Christ 2001: 399.

<sup>15</sup> Hoplites and *epibatai* (marines) were regularly drafted; conscription of trireme rowers occurred on occasion (e.g. Thuc. 3.16.1). See Gabrielsen 1994: 107.

<sup>16</sup> Rhodes (1993: 497) claims that “there was a central register of citizens qualified by age and property for military service.” This statement properly applies to the period following the introduction of conscription by age cohort in the early fourth century. See Christ 2001: 416.

<sup>17</sup> On the mythical nature of a central hoplite registry see Hansen 1985: 83–88. On the generals' role in selection see Hamel 1998: 24.

theaters.<sup>18</sup> For anything less than a city-wide call-up, these men had to create as effective a force as possible while distributing the hardships and risks of service broadly and equitably.<sup>19</sup> In practice this meant enlisting those willing to volunteer, and drafting others. Prior to the introduction of conscription by age cohort,<sup>20</sup> the generals began the process by obtaining the deme registers from the demarchs.<sup>21</sup> However, these documents did not suffice in and of themselves: they were simply not informative enough. Despite claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that they contained any of the data about wealth and social class vital to determining if a man had the means to serve in the cavalry, the phalanx, or as a marine.<sup>22</sup> It is also unlikely that the registers contained patronymics, places of residence, or other information needed to identify individuals with the desired specificity.<sup>23</sup> Finally, they did not indicate age or physical condition, although men younger than eighteen, older than fifty-nine, or physically unfit were as a rule exempt from service. The information on these documents was not just inadequate for military purposes; it was also cumbersome to update and maintain.<sup>24</sup> Generals mounting campaigns thus had either to heavily annotate the existing registers, or else to produce new lists tailored to their own purposes. Once they had identified those eligible to serve, generals also needed to make public the names of those they were drafting. They did so via *katalogoi*, tribally organized lists posted at the monument of

<sup>18</sup> E.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 60 lines 9–20. See Hamel 1998: 115 n. 1.

<sup>19</sup> For an example of a *pandēmei* (city-wide) hoplite expedition see e.g. Thuc. 2.31.1. Hamel (1998: 62) notes the tendency of Athenian democracy to make its generals particularly beholden to the men who served under them.

<sup>20</sup> This system is described in detail at [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 53.4 and 53.7. Christ (2001: 416) dates the advent of this means of conscription to the period 386–366.

<sup>21</sup> Christ 2001: 401 n. 16.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Sickinger 1999: 55. The prevalence of *aphanês ousia* (invisible property) at Athens and the existence of the *antidosis* procedure point to the difficulties of pinning down precisely a man's wealth and social class. See Gabrielsen 1986: 99. Christ (2001: 405) argues that prior hoplite service by one's father was de facto evidence of one's own wealth and membership in the hoplite class.

<sup>23</sup> Some surviving casualty lists contain multiple examples of identical names repeated without further detail among the dead of a single tribe within a given year. For example *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1147 lists the following doublets and triplets among the Erechtheid dead: Charisander 25, 50; Euthydemus 31, 77; Mnesigenes 58, 83; Philinus 79, 95, 101; Lysias 93, 99; Anaxilas 112, 142; Glaucon 136, 160. Similarly, *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1162 lists among the Cecropid dead two Aristarchuses (26, 29). And *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1184 lists twin Pantacles (36, 41) among the fallen of the Antiochis tribe. On the potentially broad consequences of mistaken or stolen identity see Dem. 39 *passim*.

<sup>24</sup> On the mutability and corruptibility of *lexiarkhika grammateia* see Cohen 2003.

the eponymous heroes in the agora.<sup>25</sup> Thereafter they also kept track of those men actually reporting for duty.<sup>26</sup> Finally, as their campaigns progressed, the generals recorded the names of those who died under arms. This last category of records ultimately formed the basis of the stone monuments erected by the polis.

Inscribed pieces of at least thirty distinct casualty lists survive,<sup>27</sup> with the earliest securely dated specimen coming from approximately 464.<sup>28</sup> One striking feature of these lists is their heterogeneity.<sup>29</sup> At one level this is apparent in their physical format. While some monuments were composed of a single stele, others were made up of several, either free-standing or conjoined.<sup>30</sup> Some monuments contained epigrams in a variety of locations; others apparently bore none. The number, grouping, and placement of the names of the dead also differed from stele to stele. With regard to inscriptional content, variety is again the rule. Some lists employed geographical rubrics, while others did not. Some provided additional information about some of the dead; others made no distinction among the fallen. Indeed, the variation among the surviving casualty lists is so pronounced that even basic questions remain unanswered. For instance, it is not clear whether these monuments regularly included the names of all those who died fighting for Athens: thetes, peltasts, metics, and allies may all have been omitted at one time or another.<sup>31</sup> Nor is it certain whether each list recorded the dead of

<sup>25</sup> Ar. *Peace* 1179–1184. The existing monument dates from ca. 350, and was preceded by an earlier one constructed shortly after 430 near the southwest corner of the agora. See Shear 1970: 219–222.

<sup>26</sup> On the phenomenon of draft evasion at Athens see Christ 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Bradeen 1969: 145.

<sup>28</sup> *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1144, whose date relies on the assumption that the dead include the fallen from Drabescus. *IG* xii Suppl. No. 337 is likely older, and may be part of a casualty list relating to an Athenian expedition. It features the term Hippothontis among the names, and is dated by letter forms to approximately the mid-480s; it may therefore be connected with the campaign against Lemnos described in Herodotus (6.137–140). However, the fragment is not of Athenian provenience. See further Clairmont 1983: 89–90 no. 3. Moreover, according to Pausanias (1.32.3), the Athenians listed tribally the names of the Marathon dead on stelai next to the *sonos*. The date at which this list was erected is not clear.

<sup>29</sup> Loraux 1986: 32.

<sup>30</sup> According to Clairmont 1983: 41–42, *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1144 may have consisted of ten separate, free-standing stelai, one per tribe.

<sup>31</sup> Loraux (1986: 35) notes that “for both *astoi* and foreigners, the rules of inscription probably varied in the course of Athenian history: the fifth-century lists show the democratic polis swinging between exclusiveness and openness, between a broad and a narrow conception of the status of the Athenian.” See further Bradeen 1969: 150–151.

a single year only, or whether some monuments combined the casualties from multiple years.<sup>32</sup> The best explanation for the variation among casualty lists is that no centralized, regular template ever existed.<sup>33</sup> On the contrary, the differing characteristics of the monuments reflect the heterogeneous nature of the initial records on which they were based. One of the few features common to almost all casualty lists, the grouping of the dead by tribe, points to individual generals as the most likely source of the inscribed information.<sup>34</sup> And the frequent inclusion of geographical data makes this assumption quite likely, given the assignment of individual generals to particular theaters.<sup>35</sup> Some monuments, such as the famous Erechtheid casualty list (*IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1147), recorded this information under a general heading (lines 2–3): “The following men of the Erechtheis tribe died in the war in Cyprus; in Egypt; in Phoenicia; in Halieis; on Aegina; at Megara; in the same year.” But other monuments were more precise, grouping the dead first by specific theater of service and then subdividing them by tribe.<sup>36</sup> Another sort of information sometimes recorded on the monuments suggests the same conclusion. While the vast majority of the dead are simply listed by name, some receive additional designations regarding their rank or branch of service;<sup>37</sup> the individual commanders were those in the best position to know and provide such information. It thus seems likely that Athenian casualty lists were derived from heterogeneous sets of generals’ records, while stonecutters collated, organized, and ultimately preserved them.

The only fully extant casualty list, *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1162, is suggestive as to the process involved. Dated to approximately 447, this monument was originally conceived as a single stele inscribed with two columns of names, each proceeding in the canonical tribal order. The left column was to record those who fell in the Chersonese, the right the dead from Byzantium. Note the parallelism of the headings: ἐγ Χερσονέσσι<sup>x7</sup> Ἀθηναίων hoίδε<sup>h7</sup> ἀπέθανον (lines 1–3), ἐμ Βυζαντίου Ἀθηναίων hoίδε<sup>h7</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Bradeen (1969: 151) argues for one year per monument. For a different view see Clairmont 1983: 20.

<sup>33</sup> Thomas (1994: 35) notes that “the classical Greek world had nothing resembling bureaucracy: records, if kept at all, tended to be slight, disorganised and in any case largely uncentralised.”

<sup>34</sup> Mitchell (2000: 344) argues that the tribal nature of the *stratégeia* was maintained to the mid-fourth century. She attributes (352) the known instances of multiple generals elected from the same tribe in any one year to a dearth of candidates in other tribes.

<sup>35</sup> Bradeen 1969: 148.

<sup>36</sup> E.g. *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 1162.

<sup>37</sup> Bradeen 1969: 147.

ἀπέθανον (lines 49–51). (“In the Chersonese, of the Athenians the following men fell; in Byzantium of the Athenians the following men fell.”) Underneath each heading was to follow a column of names and then a blank space. An epigram at the bottom was meant to link the two groups geographically and span them horizontally: *hoíde παρ’ ἡελλέσποντον ἀπόλεσαν ἀγλαὸν ἠέβεν / βαρνάμενοι* (lines 45–46). (“These men lost their shining youth fighting beside the Hellespont.”) But the dead recorded farther down at lines 41–44 and 74–97 break the pattern. Their names are inscribed by a second hand in smaller letters and spill horizontally across both columns. Moreover, they receive a separate heading: *hoíde ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πολέμοις ἀπέθανον* (lines 41–42). (“These men died in the other wars.”) This rubric lacks any precise geographical information, and differs significantly in word order from the first two. These facts suggest the following scenario. The generals assigned to the Chersonese and Byzantium provided information about their dead at roughly the same time, and a monument giving equal glory to both groups was planned. However, after the layout had been decided and inscription begun, additional information from commanders in other theaters arrived, and was accommodated in a third, catch-all section unlike the first two.<sup>38</sup>

The heterogeneity of casualty lists also suggests a lack of uniformity in the records on which they depended: not all generals will have recorded the same kinds of information, or done so in the same ways. On the contrary, individual commanders likely used writing idiosyncratically to cope with duties that were becoming increasingly complicated.<sup>39</sup> Long and distant campaigns involving thousands of troops created logistical headaches for the generals, even as difficulties in communicating with the *boulê* (Council) and *ekklêsia* back home increased their tactical independence. Moreover, these complications were accompanied by political peril, for the importance of the *stratêgeia* was on the rise. Prior to 487, archons were elected; their subsequent selection by lot decreased both their influence and eventually that of the Areopagus,

<sup>38</sup> Bradeen 1969: 146–147. The fact that the epigram was also carved by the same second hand responsible for the additional names suggests that they may have arrived from the other theaters in the middle of the process, i.e. after the epigram’s composition and before its inscription.

<sup>39</sup> In this regard, they were akin to physicians of the same time period, who used writing as a supplemental form of assistance to deal with the increasing complexity of their own professional tasks. See Dean Jones 2003.

and left the generals as the most important elected officials in Athens.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, the generals' ability to hold office repeatedly, their frequent absences from Athens, and their considerable power in the field made them less susceptible to ordinary means of oversight. All these factors made the *dêmos* somewhat jealous and suspicious, and determined to hold their nominal subordinates to account.

The *ekklêsia* responded to these new realities with a number of measures designed to keep the generals in line during their term of office and afterwards. To begin with, generals could be deposed via *apokheirotoniai* (depositions) held during the ten *kyriai ekklêsiai* (principal assemblies) held each year.<sup>41</sup> These depositions were often followed by *eisangeliai* (denunciations), which could also occur without any preliminary. According to Hansen's calculations, at least 20% of the Athenian generals between 432 and 355 were accused via *eisangelia* at one point or another. As he puts it, "in every board of ten generals there were probably at least two who, in the course of their military careers, would be denounced ... And their first *eisangelia* was usually their last, for it usually ended with a condemnation and the death sentence."<sup>42</sup> In addition, mandatory accountability procedures supervised by officials called *euthynoi* and *logistai* awaited those generals who managed to complete their terms of office.<sup>43</sup> The risks faced by generals were not tied to policy or party. For instance, during the period 490/89 to 463/2 Miltiades, Cimon, and perhaps Themistocles all fell afoul of the *dêmos* as a result of their generalships.<sup>44</sup> Being elected to the *stratêgeia* thus placed

<sup>40</sup> [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.5. Rhodes (1993: 274) notes that "this reform undoubtedly played a part in the change between the mid sixth century and the mid fifth by which the generals became the principal officers of the state and the archons became routine officials with duties which any loyal citizen could be trusted to perform." See further Hansen 1991: 233–234.

<sup>41</sup> Hamel 1998: 122–125. She cites fourteen known depositions during the period 431/0–405/4.

<sup>42</sup> Hansen 1991: 217.

<sup>43</sup> Carawan (1987: 187) sees the *logistai* as a committee of the *boulê* created in the wake of Ephialtes' reforms. Ostwald (1986: 61) views the appointment of the first *euthynoi* in similar terms. The mention of an *euthynos* in the Scambonid deme at lines 9–10 of *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 244.B and the description of Hades as a great *euthynos* at *Eumenides* 275 (dated to 458) provide support for this view. Piérart (1971: 572) argues that the *euthynoi* may go back as far as 485/4.

<sup>44</sup> On the *eisangelia*, fine, and imprisonment of Miltiades in 490/89 see Herod. 6.134–136 and Plut. *Cimon* 4.4. On the acquittal of Cimon at an *eisangelia* or *euthyna* in 463/2 see Carawan 1987: 202–205. According to one account (Diod. Sic. 11.27.3), Themistocles was deposed from his generalship in 479/8. However, Carawan (1987:

a man in a precarious position; his perils were only accentuated by the *dēmos*' tendency to pair lofty expectations with insufficient funding and resources.<sup>45</sup>

In such a climate, generals sought to protect themselves by keeping detailed records. First of all, this information could stand as a shorthand account of decisions they made and actions they took. More importantly, it could serve as a rallying point and convenient aide-mémoire for the generals' colleagues and subordinates whose testimony would be crucial in any subsequent proceedings in the *ekklēsia* or *dikastēria* (law courts).<sup>46</sup> These records, and in particular lists of names, could provide help with at least three potential trouble spots: military outcomes, financial transactions, and the treatment of the troops under one's command. First and foremost was the result of the campaign. Nothing inoculated a general against trouble like success in the field, and having accurate information about the number and kinds of troops under one's command made for better tactics, logistics, and overall strategy. Such information also offered exculpatory hedges in the event of failure. Perhaps the wrong number or kind of troops had been authorized, or insufficient monies or other resources provided. Second, accurate personnel information helped the generals substantiate their financial expenditures, such as troop pay and maintenance, and account for funds advanced them.<sup>47</sup> Finally, personnel lists let generals demonstrate their concern for and proper treatment of their troops. The commanders could use the information to show their even-handedness in drafting and assigning men,<sup>48</sup> and their meticulous accounting for those who failed to return home alive.<sup>49</sup>

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197–200) believes that Diodorus is mistaken, and connects this event instead with Themistocles' ostracism in 471/0.

<sup>45</sup> On the increase of this practice with regard to the fourth-century navy see Gabrielsen 1994: 114–118.

<sup>46</sup> These written lists would generally not constitute proof in and of themselves; on the superior authority of testimony from witnesses see Scafuro 1994. Cohen (2003: 82–83) notes “the tension in Athens between, on the one hand, an administrative, document-oriented understanding of civic identity, and a much more powerful culture of informal knowledge.”

<sup>47</sup> *IG* i<sup>3</sup> 364 shows the attention the Athenians generally devoted to such matters. Davies (1994: 208) argues that the inscription is more concerned with recording the identities of the men involved in the process than with the source of the funds.

<sup>48</sup> For complaints to the contrary see e.g. Ar. *Birds* 1180–1182, Lys. 9.5–7.

<sup>49</sup> On the early importance of this practice, epitomized later by the aftermath of the battle of Arginusae, see Aesch. *Agamemnon* 433–457 (dated to 458).

Athenian generals had a strong incentive to keep good personnel records for their own use and subsequent protection. Yet over time others developed an interest in this information as well.<sup>50</sup> For instance, access to the lists of those drafted and those actually reporting for service would have been helpful to οἱ βουλόμενοι (volunteers) wishing to prosecute military derelictions via various charges: a γραφή ἀστρατείας (failure to report or absent without leave), γραφή λιποταξίου (desertion), or γραφή δειλίας (cowardice).<sup>51</sup> Lists of those serving would also have been of concern to another group, namely the soldiers and sailors themselves. Indeed, such lists may have prompted the introduction of pay for military service, which began prior to the Peloponnesian War, perhaps as early as the 460s.<sup>52</sup> They certainly would have provided a measure of support for men seeking monies owed them, a portion of which was often withheld until they returned to Athens.<sup>53</sup> And finally, lists of the fallen must have held great interest for the families of those who did not return. Many no doubt treasured the austere meed of aristocratic *kleos* (glory) bestowed on their loved ones by casualty list,<sup>54</sup> while others clung to hope for those not named, i.e. the missing or captured.<sup>55</sup> Some will also have consulted the lists with an eye to more tangible benefits: burial of their kin's remains at state expense, and support for any surviving children.<sup>56</sup> Indeed, the beginning of the *patrios nomos* likely dates to the mid-460s,<sup>57</sup> and *Ath. Pol.* 24.3 mentions assistance to orphans as a feature of the political landscape prior to the Ephialtic reforms.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Boegehold (1972: 27) stresses the role of other interested parties in preserving the integrity of written documents. While Thomas 1994: 42 emphasizes the memorializing function of public lists, she too notes that they provided important opportunities for public verification of their contents.

<sup>51</sup> Carey (1989: 143) discusses the general imprecision of these charges, concluding that there was "some overlap between the names given to specific actions." Osborne (1985: 56) likewise treats all three actions together.

<sup>52</sup> Loomis 1998: 36–37.

<sup>53</sup> Gabrielsen 1994: 113.

<sup>54</sup> Anderson 2003: 154.

<sup>55</sup> Pritchett (1985: 190, 199) notes the importance of listing those missing in action.

<sup>56</sup> [Dem.] 59.105 suggests that the stele listing the Plataeans who were granted Athenian citizenship served a similar function.

<sup>57</sup> The *terminus ante quem* is provided by *IG* I<sup>3</sup> 1144, dated to ca. 464. Clairmont (1983: 13) argues for a date in the mid-470s.

<sup>58</sup> Stroud (1971: 288) cites Diogenes Laertius 1.55 as evidence that the practice may in fact date back to Solon. Rhodes (1993: 308) is skeptical about the value of the *Ath. Pol.* evidence, given his view (282–286) that chapters 23–28 are based on a number of

In conclusion, generals in classical Athens maintained at least four types of lists of military personnel: those eligible for service; those called up; those serving; and those who died. They did so individually and idiosyncratically, prompted by a desire to protect themselves against an antagonistic *dêmos* bent on holding them to account. Their lists rapidly took on a more public dimension, however, eventually becoming a form of commonly held intellectual capital that supported the city's democratic and imperial practices.<sup>59</sup> The cumulative effect, while originally unintended, was a substantial enhancement of Athens' military capabilities. On the eve of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles linked his hopes for victory to the city's considerable resources. In addition to the funds at its disposal Athens had, he said, "an army of thirteen thousand heavy infantry, besides sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on home duty at Athens ... [these latter] were composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens who had heavy armor ... Pericles also showed that they had twelve hundred horse including mounted archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred galleys fit for service" (Thuc. 2.13). The ability of this perennial *stratêgos* to offer such precise figures, and indeed to think in these categories at all, resulted from a trend towards increased military record-keeping that had grown up at Athens over the last half century. Perhaps even more important than the Athenian resources themselves were the habits of mind which led to their tabulation. Taken together, both factors gave Athens a considerable advantage when push came to shove.

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sources of differing dates and viewpoints. The *terminus ante quem* for the practice is given by Pericles' mention of it in his funeral oration of 430 (Thuc. 2.46.1).

<sup>59</sup> While generals likely took their lists with them on campaigns in the field, additional versions may have been stored in the *stratêgeion* (generals' office) in the agora.

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